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Abstract
In this paper we bring a novel approach to the theory of tournament rankings. We
combine two different theories that are widely used to establish rankings of populations
after a given tournament. First, we use the statistical approach of paired comparison
analysis to define the performance of a player in a natural way. Then, we determine a
ranking (and rating) of the players in the given tournament. Finally, we show, among
other properties, that the new ranking method is the unique one satisfying a natural
consistency requirement.
1 Introduction
When there is a competition among the members of a population, the fundamental problem
is to rank these members according to their strength.1 In certain cases this confrontation
takes the form of a tournament in which contestants play against themselves obtaining a
certain score in each match. The aim is to determine a final ranking after all the matches
have been played. Because of the wide range of applications of ranking theory, the latter
problem has already been widely studied in management science, economic theory and
statistics. The books by Moon (1968) and Laslier (1997) and the paper Iqbal et al. (1986)
discuss several applications of the theory of tournament rankings.
Formally, a ranking of a population N is a complete, reflexive and transitive relation on
N . To fix notation, we use the word rating when we have a cardinal ranking, that is, not
only do we have an ordering of the contestants, but also a measure of the intensities of the
differences among them.
In this paper, we define a measure of the strength exhibited by the players of a given
tournament that we call performance. More specifically, we assume that there is a distribu-
tion function that governs the random process associated with the competitive environment
in which the given tournament takes place. Within this setting, the performance of a player
∗Corresponding author: Kellogg School of Management (CMS-EMS), Northwestern University. 5100
Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road. Evanston, IL 60208-2014. Phone number: +1 847-467-1745. Fax: +1
847-491-2530. E-mail address: julio@northwestern.edu
1We usually refer to the members of our population as contestants or players, but they may also be other
objects such as scientific journals, political options or products to be tested.
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is naturally defined as a function of his results and the strength of his opponents. Then,
we define a new ranking method, the recursive performance, and show that it is the unique
one that is consistent with the notion of performance.
The most natural attempt to associate a ranking to a given tournament is to use the
scores ranking. That is, rank the players according to their total scores. Rubinstein (1980)
provides an axiomatic characterization of the scores ranking. Nonetheless, it is often the case
that several players have the same score and, hence, in most scenarios this ranking method
does not provide an ordering of the players. On the other hand, most ranking methods
determine the ranking of a player according to the results obtained in the tournament
and the strength of the opponents the player has played against, being this last feature
missing when using the scores ranking.2 One widely used ranking method that takes the
previous considerations into account is the minimum violations ranking, where one violation
consists of two players whose relative ranking differs from the one induced by their result
against each other. This ranking method is discussed, for instance, in Goddard (1983)
and Iqbal et al. (1986). However, Stob (1985) is quite critical with it and sticks up for
the statistical approach of paired comparison analysis initiated in Zermelo (1929) for chess
tournaments and rediscovered by Bradley and Terry (1952).
In Bradley and Terry (1952), each player i is assumed to have a strength parameter ri.
It is also assumed that there exists a distribution F such that F (ri, rj) is the probability
that i beats j. The objective is to fix a distribution F that properly fits the available data
and then, using statistical tools, calculate the most likely values of the strength parameters
ri. Once these values are calculated, they may be used to define a rating for each player. As
compared with the minimum violations ranking, Stob (1985) emphasizes that this approach
endogenizes the relevance that must be given to the different victories (losses) of the players,
a feature that we also consider very desirable. Two classic references within this framework
are Kendall and Smith (1940) and David (1988).
Finally, a third approach comes from economic theory, where it is often the case that
an axiomatic approach is taken to determine a ranking of the population N . First, it is
assumed that there is a matrix containing the relevant information about the paired results
of the different players; this matrix is usually referred to as the tournament matrix. Then, a
ranking method is defined as a function that ascribes a ranking to each tournament matrix.
Next, the properties of the different methods are studied. Finally, a ranking method, whose
properties are suitable for a given competitive environment, is chosen. To deepen into the
economic literature on rankings refer to Rubinstein (1980), Liebowitz and Palmer (1984),
Amir (2002), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004), and Slutzki and Volij (2005).
In this paper we consider a competitive environment with an associated function F
that describes the underlying random process. This function is determined from the data
of the historical confrontations of the players in a population. Then, we assume that we
have one more tournament and we want to rank the players of that tournament accord-
ing to their results. Next, we bring together two widely used ideas. On the one hand,
our ranking method, the recursive performance, is defined using a recursive formula that
resembles the Liebowitz-Palmer method (Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984) and other similar
methods (Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2004) studied in economic theory. On the other hand,
our recursive formula uses the rating function F , so basic in the statistical approach to
paired comparison analysis. Moreover, we show one property of our ranking method that
is crucial for its applicability. Namely, our ranking method is robust with respect to the
estimation of the function F , that is, small changes in the function F lead to small changes
2Indeed, this is the reason why the scores ranking is mainly used in round-robin tournaments, where
each player faces the same opponents.
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in the proposed rating. Finally, concerning the computation of our ranking method, we
show that it reduces to solving a linear system.
Within the literature in which this paper is enclosed, there is a family of tournaments
that has received special attention: the round-robin tournaments. In these tournaments
each player plays exactly once against any other player. The minimum violations ranking
is essentially thought for this class of tournaments. Stob (1985) showed that, under quite
general assumptions, the ranking methods defined using the approach of Zermelo (1929)
lead to the same ordering as the scores ranking. We briefly discuss the behavior of our
approach in round-robin tournaments at the end of Section 4.
As an immediate application, the results obtained in this paper can be applied to define
new tie-breaking rules for disciplines such as chess and Othello.3 In our opinion, these new
tie-breaking rules improve the existent ones (see Sections 4 and 5 for details).
We briefly describe the contents of this paper. In Section 2 we present the concept of
tournament and comment on the assumptions used throughout this paper. In Section 3 we
formally define and discuss the notion of performance. Section 4 is the core of our study; we
introduce the so-called recursive performance and give examples of tournaments in which
it might be immediately applied. In Section 5 we discuss two properties of the recursive
performance ranking method: robustness and consistency. Finally, in Section 6 we prove
the results presented in Sections 4 and 5.
2 Basic Definitions: Tournaments
We have a competitive environment in which confrontations between the different players
of a population take place along time. For such an environment, there is a rating function
F that accurately describes the probabilities associated with the different results of each
match between any two given players. This rating function is such that, given two players i
and j with strength parameters ri and rj , the probability that i beats j is F (ri, rj). Thus,
F (ri, rj) = 1− F (rj , ri).
4 We refer to the strength parameters ri as ratings.
We work within the linear paired comparison model (David, 1988). More specifically, we
assume that there is a strictly increasing continuous distribution function Fl : R → (0, 1)
such that F (r1, r2) = Fl(r1 − r2), that is, the result of a game between any two players
depends only on their rating difference. The probability that i beats j goes to 1 as ri − rj
grows and the probability that i beats j is positive regardless of the rating difference.
Moreover, since F (ri, rj) = 1− F (rj , ri), Fl is symmetrically distributed about zero. Also,
note that the function F−1l is well defined.
The result of a confrontation between two players i and j may be not only a win or
a loss but any pair (ai, aj) with ai, aj ≥ 0, ai + aj = 1. Within this scenario we might
interpret F (ri, rj) as the expected score of player i when facing player j.
We denote by Mk×l the vector space of real k × l matrices. A tournament is a pair
(N,A), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and A ∈Mn×n is the tournament matrix.
The matrix A is non-negative and its main diagonal consists of zeros. The entry Aij contains
the score achieved by player i in his confrontations against player j. Note that we do not
restrict the non-zero entries in our matrix A to be natural numbers as in Slutzki and Volij
(2005). To each tournament (N,A) we can naturally associate a (symmetric) matches
matrix M(A) := A + At, i.e., M(A)ij is the number of matches between i and j. For
3Remarkably, ties are always present in tournaments in which pairings are drawn following the Swiss
pairing system, which is, along with the round-robin system, the most widely used in these disciplines.
4For instance, chess and Othello use rating systems based on functions that have already been widely
tested.
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notational simplicity, when no confusion arises we denote M(A) by M . Since the n players
participate in the tournament, each row of M must have a nonzero entry. For each player
i, let mi :=
∑n
j=1Mij denote the total number of matches played by i. Let r ∈ R
n be a
vector of exogenously given ratings of the players in the tournament (N,A). We refer to r
as the vector of initial ratings.
Given a tournament (N,A) and a vector of ratings r, we define the total strength of
the tournament by σr :=
∑n
i=1miri, that is, the contribution of each player to the total
strength of the tournament is weighted by the number of matches he has played. Similarly,
we define the average strength of the tournament by σ¯r := σr/
∑n
i=1mi. Note that, if all
the players have played the same number of games, the average strength of the tournament
is just the average of the vector of initial ratings.
Summarizing, the primitives of our model are a tournament (N,A), a rating function F ,
and a vector of initial ratings r. In this paper we present a ranking and rating method for
the tournament in question. Our ranking method reallocates among the players the total
strength of the tournament, σr , with two important features: first, the proposed ranking
does not depend on r and, second, the difference between the proposed ratings for any two
players is also independent of r. That is, our method is endogenous to (N,A) and the vector
r is used just for the sake of exposition.
Since the ranking method we define in this paper is anonymous, the labels chosen for
indexing the players are irrelevant. Based on this fact, two tournaments that are equal up
to labeling are said equivalent. We make this definition precise. Denote by Lαβ ∈ Mn×n
the transposition matrix that swaps the αth and βth entries of a vector. A transposition
matrix satisfies L−1αβ = Lαβ and, given B ∈Mn×n, the product LαβB is the same matrix B
but with rows α and β interchanged. Similarly, BLαβ interchanges columns α and β of B.
The group Πn generated by the composition of transposition matrices Lαβ is isomorphic to
the group of permutations of n elements. Given two populations N and N ′ with n players,
we say that two tournaments (N,A) and (N ′, A′) are equivalent if there exists L ∈ Πn
such that A = LA′Lt. Note that the latter also implies that M = LM ′Lt. Since for each
L ∈ Πn we have L
−1 = Lt, two equivalent tournaments have similar tournament matrices
and similar matches matrices.
A matrix B ∈Mn×n is block diagonal, respectively block anti-diagonal, if
B =
(
∗ 0
0 ∗
)
, respectively B =
(
0 ∗
∗ 0
)
.
Note that, given a tournament (N,A), A is block diagonal (anti-diagonal) if and only if
M is block diagonal (anti-diagonal). We assume that our tournaments satisfy the following
two natural assumptions:
A1. The tournament (N,A) is not equivalent to a tournament (N ′, A′) such that A′ is block
diagonal.
If the tournament matrix A′ is block diagonal, the tournament has an internal division:
there are two disjoint subsets of players such that none of the players of one set has played
against anyone of the other set. This is a standard assumption in the ranking’s literature
since each block may be considered as the matrix of an independent tournament.
A2. The tournament (N,A) is not equivalent to a tournament (N ′, A′) such that A′ is block
anti-diagonal.
If A′ is block anti-diagonal, the tournament may be considered as a team-tournament.
There are two disjoint subsets (teams) such that the players of each team have played only
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against the players of the other, but not among themselves. Although similar to A1, this
property is more subtle and has different implications. In this case, in order to calculate the
strength of the players of one team, we need the strength of the players of the other team
that can only be calculated using the strength of the players in the first team. This cyclic
feature of team-tournaments is the reason why, if A2 is not met, the iterative method we
describe in Section 4 does not necessarily converge.
3 The Notion of Performance
Let (N,A) be a tournament. The vector of average scores, s, is defined by si :=
∑
j Aij/mi.
Hereafter, we assume that s ∈ (0, 1)n. We define DM := diag(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Mn×n and
M¯ := (DM )−1M ∈Mn×n, that is, M¯ij =Mij/mi is the number of confrontations between
i and j divided by the total number of matches played by i.
Let r ∈ Rn be the vector of initial ratings and let F be the distribution function of the
linear paired comparison model. The vector of r-performances, pr ∈ Rn, is defined as
pr := M¯r + c, where ci := F
−1
l (si).
Note that (M¯r)i coincides with the average rating of the opponents of player i. Hence, the
r-performance of player i is the unique rating pri such that F (p
r
i , (M¯r)i) = si. Then, we
might say that si is i’s expected score against a player of rating (M¯r)i if and only if i has
a rating pri . This justifies the name performance.
The vector pr depends on the tournament and the rating function associated with the
competitive environment which the tournament belongs to. Nevertheless, it also depends
on the vector of initial ratings, which is exogenous to the tournament. On the other hand,
the r-performance of player i takes into account the strengths of his opponents; however
we consider that also the opponents of the opponents of i should be used to calculate the
strengths of the opponents of i, and the r-performances do not do so. We devote Section 4
to address these two problems.
Example 1. The World Chess Federation (FIDE) has an official rating of players called Elo.
Elo’s formula considers the distribution Fl given by Fl(λ) = 1/
(
1 + 10−
λ
400
)
. Hence, the
r-performance of player i in a tournament is defined as pri = (M¯r)i − 400 log10(1/si − 1),
that is, the average of the Elos of his opponents plus a correcting factor depending on the
percentage of points achieved by the player. Remarkably, this is one of the tie-breaking
rules recommended by the FIDE for chess tournaments.
The assumption s ∈ (0, 1)n is needed in order to define the vector of performances
correctly, but this situation holds in most tournaments. Indeed, the r-performance ranking
method is already used as a tie breaking rule for chess tournaments, as we have just seen.
The idea of this method is to use the strengths of the opponents of the players to define
the rankings. Note that the vector r is the “historical” strength of the players whereas the
vector c is, essentially, the score of each player in the tournament. Hence, pr measures the
results of a player in relation to the strength of his opponents.
4 Recursive Performance
In the definition of r-performance, the vector c depends crucially on the rating function
F and, although our notation does not make this dependence explicit, the rating function
keeps being an essential element of this paper.
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The ranking associated with the vector of r-performances is not a bad ranking for the
tournament, but it heavily depends on the initial ratings r1, . . . , rn. The latter measure the
historical strength of the players, which might be different from the strength exhibited by
the players in the tournament. Moreover, in the paired comparison literature, these ratings
are often calculated using the method of maximum likelihood, and thus, they are subject
to statistical errors.
The objective of this section and the next one is to formally introduce a new ranking
method, the recursive performance, and discuss some of its properties. Refer to Section 6
for the technical results and their corresponding proofs.
As we have already discussed in Section 3, even though (pr)i is a better indicator of
the strength of i in the given tournament than his initial rating, using the vector pr as a
ranking method has relevant shortcomings. Nonetheless, it is natural to calculate a new
performance by replacing the initial ratings with the vector of performances. This would
have two main effects. Namely, it would shade the dependence on r and, given a player i,
the new rating would take into account, not only the opponents of i, but also their results
(i.e., using the opponents of the opponents of i as well). This suggests the iterative method
p(0) := pr (= M¯r + c), p(l+1) := pp
(l)
(= M¯p(l) + c). Unfortunately, this method does not
necessarily converge. On the other hand, the total strength of the tournament, σr, is not
preserved by the r-performance, that is,
∑
imiri 6=
∑
imip
r
i in general. The inflation or
deflation factor turns out to be
∑
imici. By distributing this factor among the players, we
define a new iterative method that does preserve the total strength of the tournament.
Let e ∈ Rn be the vector e = (1, . . . , 1). Consider the following rescaling of c,
cˆ := c−
(∑
imici∑
imi
)
e,
which we discuss below. We define the iterated performance as the iterative method
pˆ(0) := M¯r + cˆ
pˆ(l) := M¯ pˆ(l−1) + cˆ, l ∈ N.
At each step l, this iterative method gives the same rating as the previous one up to a
constant proportional to e and, hence, the two proposed rankings are always the same. This
is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For each l ∈ N, p(l) − pˆ(l) = (l + 1)
(P
i
miciP
i
mi
)
e.
Proof. Since by definition of M¯ , M¯e = e, the result follows by an induction argument.
In Section 6 we prove that, under our assumptions, the iterated performance converges.
More specifically, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. Let (N,A) be a tournament satisfying assumptions A1 and A2 and such
that A¯ij ∈ (0, 1) whenever Mij 6= 0. Let r ∈ R
n be a vector of initial ratings and Fl the
distribution of the linear paired comparison model. Then the iterated performance converges.
Motivated by Theorem 2, we define the main concept of this paper, the recursive per-
formance, as the limit of the iterated performance: pˆ := liml→∞ pˆ
(l). Taking limits in the
equality pˆ(l) = M¯ pˆ(l−1) + cˆ, we get that pˆ is a solution of the linear system
(I − M¯)x = cˆ, (1)
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where I ∈ Mn×n is the identity matrix. If A1 holds, by Theorem 5 (iii) below the matrix
I − M¯ has rank n − 1. Then, since M¯e = e, the whole set of solutions of (1) is given by
pˆ + span{e}. The different solutions of (1) arise from different initial vectors of ratings r.
It is important to note that all the solutions propose the same ranking.
Following the previous discussion, even if A2 does not hold, we can unambiguously
associate a ranking to each linear system (1) as far as A1 is met.
Example 2. An ideal chess-like tournament is a tournament in which all the players play
the same number of rounds, say k.5 Thus, for an ideal chess-like tournament (N,A) we have
DM = kI and, hence, M¯ = M/k. By Corollary 7 below,
∑
imipˆ
(l)
i =
∑
imiri = σ
r for all
l ∈ N. Since mi = k for all i ∈ N , in an ideal chess-like tournament we have
∑
i pˆ
(l)
i =
∑
i ri.
This shows that, using cˆ instead of c, we adjust the vectors after each iteration to ensure
that the sum of the ratings after each step remains constant. The average strength of an
ideal tournament, σ¯r, coincides with the average of the components of r. In each iteration
the method proposes a way to divide the total strength of the tournament, σr, among the
players. That is, by working with cˆ instead of c, we avoid inflation or deflation in the vectors
of iterated performances. Since the recursive performance is the limit of such vectors, it
also provides a way of dividing the total strength of the tournament among the players. In
a general tournament, the same property holds, but in this case the average strength of the
tournament is calculated as a weighted average (by the mi’s) of the components of r.
Example 3. A round-robin tournament (N,A) is a tournament in which all the players have
played exactly once against each other. That is, Mij = 1 if i 6= j and Mii = 0.
6 Within this
family of tournaments, the ranking proposed by the recursive performance has an appealing
feature: it coincides with the ranking proposed by the vector of average scores (the standard
scores ranking method). To see this, let x be a solution of the system (1). Then, the claim
follows from the equality cˆi − cˆj = xi −
∑
k 6=i
xk
(n−1) − xj +
∑
k 6=j
xk
(n−1) =
n
n−1 (xi − xj).
This is not surprising since the ranking proposed by the recursive performance uses both
the scores of the players and the scores of the opponents, but all the players have the same
opponents.
5 Main Properties: Robustness and Consistency
Since all the solutions of (1) propose the same ranking, the recursive performance ranking
method does not depend on the vector of initial ratings. Moreover, the recursive perfor-
mance ranking can be unambiguously calculated for tournaments in which there are unrated
players (players with no historical results). Thus, if there is an unrated player, we can as-
sign him an arbitrarily chosen rating and this election does not affect the final ranking.
The recursive performance proposes a way to divide the total strength of the tournament
among the players. Therefore, when used as a rating method, there is neither inflation nor
deflation with respect to the initial ratings.
Robustness in F
In order to apply the recursive performance in a given competitive environment, we first
need to estimate the function F that governs it. This estimation is subject to error and
5Most tournaments in disciplines such as chess and Othello have this property.
6Round-robin tournaments have a special structure and different approaches have been taken to define
ranking methods within this family of tournaments. See for instance Daniels (1969), Stob (1985) and
Chapter 6.1 in David (1988).
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hence we need to ensure that the ranking method is robust in F , that is, small changes of
F lead to small changes of the recursive performance. This follows immediately from the
fact that the recursive performance is a solution of the linear system (1).
Consistency with F
Given two vectors of ratings r1, r2 ∈ Rn, we say that they are essentially identical for
function F if F (r1i , r
1
j ) = F (r
2
i , r
2
j ) for all i 6= j. That is, two vectors are essentially
identical if they lead to the same predictions for any given match between players in N .
In linear paired comparisons analysis this is equivalent to the existence of λ ∈ R such that
r1 = r2 + λe.
Lemma 3. Let (N,A) be a tournament and Fl a linear rating function. Then, all the
solutions of (1) are essentially identical for function Fl.
Proof. It follows from the fact that all the solutions of (1) are of the form pˆ+span{e}.
Because of this property, we make a slight abuse of language and use the words recur-
sive performance to encompass all the solutions of (1). Then, the total strength of the
tournament suffices to pin a unique rating.
Now, we are ready to introduce a consistency property. We say that a rating r ∈ Rn
is consistent with F for tournament (N,A) if the r-performance rating vector is essentially
identical to r. This consistency property can also be extended to any ranking (not neces-
sarily cardinal). A ranking  is consistent with F for the tournament (N,A) if there is a
rating r ∈ Rn that is consistent with F and whose induced ranking coincides with .
At the end of Section 6 we give a proof of the following result.
Proposition 4. Let (N,A) be a tournament and Fl a linear rating function. Then, the
ranking induced by the recursive performance is the unique one that is consistent with Fl.
6 Mathematical results
In this section we prove the technical results we have used throughout Sections 4 and 5.
Although these results are stated for tournaments, they may be written just in terms of
linear algebra. We follow Ciarlet (1989).
A linear iterative method is (globally) convergent if and only if the eigenvalues of the
corresponding matrix are, in absolute value, less than 1. For any tournament (N,A) we
have M¯e = e and thus 1 is an eigenvalue of M¯ . In this section we prove that, under the
assumptions A1 and A2, the iterated performance restricts to a vector subspace where the
absolute values of the eigenvalues of M¯ are less than 1 and, hence, the method converges.
Let (N,A) be a tournament. For each v, w ∈ Rn, we define 〈v, w〉 := vtDMw =∑n
i=1miviwi. Since D
M is a diagonal matrix and mi > 0 for all i, 〈·, ·〉 is an inner product
in Rn, which generalizes the Euclidean inner product. The former, which depends on the
tournament, is referred to as the inner product associated with (N,A).
If (N,A) is a tournament, then M is a symmetric matrix but M¯ is not symmetric in
general. However, there is a kind of symmetry in M¯ , namely, M¯ij = 0 if and only if
M¯ji = 0. Motivated by this fact, we say that two matrices B ∈ Mk×l and C ∈ Ml×k
are null-transpose if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and each j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, Bij = 0 if and only if
Cji = 0. With a slight abuse of notation we denote by B
nt a matrix that is null-transpose
of B. Note that, although Bnt is not unique, Bnt = 0 if and only if B = 0.
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Theorem 5. Let (N,A) be a tournament and 〈·, ·〉 its associated inner product. Then
(i) The matrix M¯ is self-adjoint with respect to 〈·, ·〉. Moreover, it is diagonalizable, its
eigenvalues are real and the eigenspaces are orthogonal with respect to 〈·, ·〉.
(ii) If λ is an eigenvalue of M¯ , then |λ| ≤ 1.
(iii) (N,A) satisfies A1 if and only if the multiplicity of the eigenvalue 1 is one.
(iv) (N,A) satisfies A2 if and only if −1 is not an eigenvalue of M¯ .
Proof. Let (N,A) and (N ′, A′) be equivalent tournaments with matches matricesM andM ′
respectively. Then, there exists L ∈ Πn such thatM = LM
′L−1. Clearly, DM = LDM
′
L−1
and thus M¯ = LM¯ ′L−1. Hence, M¯ and M¯ ′ are similar matrices and their eigenvalue
structure is the same. Therefore, we may make, without loss of generality, any assumption
regarding the ordering of the indices. We also recall that M¯ij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
For each k ∈ N, we define ek := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rk. Note that en = e.
Claim (i): Since M and DM are symmetric, 〈v, M¯w〉 = vtDMM¯w = vtMw = wtMv =
wtDMM¯v = (M¯v)tDMw = 〈M¯v, w〉. The second part follows from the spectral theorem.
Claim (ii): The matrix norm ‖·‖∞ is defined as ‖B‖∞ := maxi∈{1,...,n}
∑n
j=1|Bij | for
any B ∈ Mn×n. By definition we have ‖M¯‖∞ = 1 and hence (ii) follows from Theorem
1.4-3 in Ciarlet (1989).
Claim (iii): Assume that (N,A) does not satisfy A1. Then, M¯ may be written as
M¯ =
(
C 0
0 E
)
, with C ∈Mk×k and E ∈Ml×l.
Hence, M¯(ek|0) = (ek|0) and M¯(0|el) = (0|el). Thus, 1 has multiplicity at least 2.
Conversely, assume that 1 has multiplicity greater than one. Then, since M¯ is diagonal-
izable there exists v ∈ Rn, linearly independent from e, such that M¯v = v. Assume that
v1 = 1 and that the components of v are decreasingly ordered, that is, vi ≥ vj for i > j.
Let k ∈ N be such that vk = 1 and vk+1 < 1. Since v and e are linearly independent, k < n
and M¯ may be decomposed as
M¯ =
(
C1 E
Ent C2
)
, where C1 ∈Mk×k, C2 ∈ M(n−k)×(n−k) and E ∈Mk×(n−k). (2)
Now, if E has a nonzero row, namely row i, we get
1 = vi = (M¯v)i =
k∑
j=1
M¯ij +
n∑
j=k+1
M¯ijvj <
n∑
j=1
M¯ij = 1,
contradiction. This proves E = 0 and Ent = 0, which is a contradiction with A1.
Claim (iv): Assume (N,A) does not satisfy A2. Then we may write M¯ as
M¯ =
(
0 C
E 0
)
, with C ∈Mk×l and E ∈ Ml×k.
Hence, M¯(ek| − el) = −(ek| − el) and −1 is an eigenvalue of M¯ .
Conversely, assume that −1 is an eigenvalue of M¯ . Let v ∈ Rn be such that M¯v = −v
and 1 = v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn ≥ −1. Again, there exists k ∈ N, k < n such that vk = 1 and
vk+1 < 1. Hence, M¯ may be decomposed as in (2).
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We show that C1 = 0. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since
∑n
j=1 M¯ij = 1, we have
−1 = −vi = (M¯v)i =
k∑
j=1
M¯ij+
n∑
j=k+1
M¯ijvj ≥
k∑
j=1
M¯ij+
(
1−
k∑
j=1
M¯ij
)
(−1) = 2
k∑
j=1
M¯ij−1.
Hence,
∑k
j=1 M¯ij ≤ 0. Since M¯ij ≥ 0, the ith row of C1 is zero. Therefore, C1 = 0.
Note that vn = −1 since, otherwise, taking i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we get −1 = −vi = (M¯v)i =∑n
j=k+1 M¯ijvj > −1. Let l ∈ N be such that vn−l > −1 and vj = −1 for j ≥ n− l. Clearly,
l > 0. Then, we may further decompose M¯ as
M¯ =

 0 E1 E2Ent1 C21 C22
Ent2 C
nt
22 C23

 with E = (E1|E2) , C2 =
(
C21 C22
Cnt22 C23
)
and E2 ∈Mk×l.
If k + l = n, then this second decomposition is trivial (E = E2 and C2 = C23). Otherwise,
we claim that E1 = 0. If the ith row of E1 is nonzero, then there is j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n− l}
such that vj > −1. Hence, −1 = −vi = (M¯v)i =
∑n
j=k+1 M¯ijvj > −1, contradiction.
Therefore, E1 = 0.
Now, we show that (Cnt22 |C23) is zero. If the ith row of (C
nt
22 |C23) is nonzero, then there
is j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n} such that vj < 1. Hence, 1 = −vi = (M¯v)i =
∑n
j=1 M¯ijvj < 1,
contradiction. Therefore, the above decomposition reduces to
M¯ =

 0 0 E20 C21 0
Ent2 0 0

 ,
which contradicts A2.7
Corollary 6. Let (N,A) be a tournament satisfying assumptions A1 and A2. Then,
lim
l→∞
M¯ l =
1∑n
i=1mi


m1 · · · mn
...
...
m1 · · · mn

 .
Proof. Let v ∈ Rn. By Theorem 5 there exists a basis of eigenvectors {w1 = e, w2, . . . , wn},
orthogonal with respect to the inner product associated with (N,A), which we denote by
〈·, ·〉. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let λi be the eigenvalue associated with wi. Now, it suffices to
show that (liml→∞ M¯
l)v = ( 1trDM ee
tDM )v for all v ∈ Rn. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
〈(liml→∞ M¯
l)v, wi〉 = liml→∞〈v, M¯
lwi〉 = (liml→∞ λ
l
i)〈v, wi〉. Since λ1 = 1 and |λi| < 1 for
each i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we get (liml→∞ M¯
l)v = (〈v, e〉/〈e, e〉)e. By definition of 〈·, ·〉, we have
〈e, e〉 = trDM and 〈v, e〉 = etDMv, from where the result follows.
Corollary 7. Let (N,A) be a tournament satisfying A1 and A2. Let 〈·, ·〉 be its associ-
ated inner product. Then, for all l ∈ N, 〈pˆ(l), e〉 = 〈r, e〉, or equivalently,
∑
imipˆ
(l)
i =∑
imiri = σ
r.
Proof. Recall that M¯ is self-adjoint with respect to 〈·, ·〉 by Theorem 5 (i). By Corollary 6,
liml→∞ M¯
l exists and (liml→∞ M¯
l)c =
(
(
∑
imici)/(
∑
imi)
)
e. Hence, 〈cˆ, e〉 = 〈c, e〉 −
〈(liml→∞ M¯
l)c, e〉 = 〈c, e〉 − liml→∞〈c, M¯
le〉 = 0. Then, 〈pˆ(0), e〉 = 〈r, M¯e〉+ 〈cˆ, e〉 = 〈r, e〉.
By induction, 〈pˆ(l), e〉 = 〈pˆ(l−1), M¯e〉+ 〈cˆ, e〉 = 〈r, e〉.
7Note that, if the latter decomposition happens to be nontrivial (presence of C21), we also violate A1.
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We are now ready to prove the main result of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 2. Defining q(l) := pˆ(l) − r for l ≥ 0 we have the equivalent iterative
method q(0) = M¯r + cˆ− r and q(l) = M¯q(l−1) + q(0), l ∈ N. Let 〈·, ·〉 be the inner product
associated with (N,A). By Corollary 7, 〈q(l), e〉 = 0 for all l ∈ N. Therefore, the iterative
method restricts to the vector subspace e⊥. By Theorem 5, the absolute values of the
eigenvalues of M¯|e⊥ are smaller than 1. Hence, the iterative method converges (Ciarlet,
1989).
Proof of Proposition 4. Let  be a ranking consistent with Fl. Then, there exists a rating
r ∈ Rn and a constant λ ∈ R such that r = pr + λe = M¯r + c+ λe. Taking inner product
with e (as in Corollary 6) we get 〈r, e〉 = 〈r, e〉 + 〈c, e〉 + λ〈e, e〉. Hence, λ = −〈c, e〉/〈e, e〉
and thus c+ λe = cˆ. This implies that r is a solution of (1) and the result follows.
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